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Friendship for the Flawed:
A Cynical and Pessimistic Theory of Friendship
G. M. Trujillo, Jr.
University of Louisville
Abstract: When considering the value of friendship, most philosophers
ignore the negatives. Most assume that humans need friends to ﬂourish,
and some argue that friendships can be good, no matter the risks entailed.
This makes conversations about the value of friendship one-sided. Here,
I argue that Cynics and Pessimists have an important view on friendship,
despite it being ignored. They hold that: (a) friendship is unnecessary
for ﬂourishing, and (b) friendship presents ethical risks, especially to
one’s own self-sufﬁciency. I defend these views. Then I conclude with
reﬂections on why Cynics and Pessimists actually make great friends. By
helping people to focus on vulgar human nature and the ﬂaws that humans
have, they create an unpretentious basis for friendship.
Cicero writes, “For when fortune smiles on us, friendship adds a luster to
that smile; when she frowns, friendship absorbs her part and share of that
frown, and thus makes it easier to bear” (1991, p. 88).1 No one denies
that friendship makes life better. But maybe that is a problem. Maybe
most philosophers addressing friendship are guilty of conﬁrmation bias,
seeking only opinions that prove themselves right about the positive value
of friendship.2
However, it is a big philosophical leap from recognizing friendship’s
frequent beneﬁts to deeming it necessary for ﬂourishing or good apart
from moral evaluation. Yet many authors do just that. They afﬁrm that
friendship is necessary for a good life (e.g. Aristotle, 2002; Sherman,
1993). Or they argue that friendships have their own type of goodness
that can exist even in morally compromising situations (e.g. Cocking and
Kennett, 2000). These two evaluations puzzle me because they seem
selective in their focus.
I want to argue against these prevalent trends in the friendship
literature by taking an intermediary position. It involves defending two
things. First, while friendship often helps someone ﬂourish, it should
not be thought necessary for ﬂourishing for all people (contra Aristotle).
Second, the value of friendship cannot be separated from its moral risks,
especially to our own characters (contra Cocking and Kennett).3
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These ideas come from unlikely sources of wisdom on friendship:
Cynics and Pessimists. Taken together, Diogenes of Sinope, Crates of
Thebes, and Arthur Schopenhauer present a view of friendship that
is honest to human ﬂaws. I put them in dialogue here because their
philosophical styles are similar, and almost no other philosophers warn
against friendship like they do. I will argue that their view shows that
(1) philosophers are mistaken if they consider friendship necessary for
ﬂourishing for all, and (2) friendship always imposes risk to your character
and sometimes entails burdensome social obligations.4 I will conclude by
arguing that Cynics and Pessimists show us how to be good friends. To do
this, I will (a) set up the two puzzles about friendship that I mentioned here
and (b) argue that the combined Cynic and Pessimist view can solve them.
My point is not that friendship is bad or that we should be misanthropes.5
The point is that we should feel ambivalent. Most good things in life are
not just good; they are usually complicated. Friendship is one such good,
and that is why I think we should listen to these neglected voices.6

Challenge 1: You Need Friends to Live Well

Aristotle set the agenda for philosophizing about friendship. Yet tragedy
looms in his theory. On the one hand, humans are naturally political
beings, living together with others (1984b, I.2). We have friends and seek
associations. Aristotle explains why, “The presence of friends, then, seems
desirable in all circumstances” (1984a, IX.11 [emphasis added]). Friendship
helps us. Friends make misfortune bearable, and without them, the most
blessed pursuits become arduous (1984a, IX.9-10). For Aristotle, friendship
is not merely ornamental; it is necessary for ﬂourishing. Without friendship,
life is incomplete.
On the other hand, Aristotle realizes the difﬁculty of making friends,
claiming that people cannot make excellent friends with many others.
Having a few friends is the best we should hope for (1984a, IX.10).7
Becoming a good person is difﬁcult, so ﬁnding another good person to
venture through life with is twice as hard. There is challenge not only on
our own singular journeys toward virtue and ﬂourishing, but there is added
challenge in ﬁnding worthy others to befriend, especially virtuous people
who like you and make time for you.8 And if we cannot to do this, we are
not fully ﬂourishing. Friendship and ﬂourishing therefore depend on luck
by relying on other people, an unsurprising conclusion for anyone familiar
with Aristotle. Flourishing, for him, just is difﬁcult, and it is subject to mis/
fortune.9 But human animals simply need friendships to live well, no matter
their scarcity or difﬁculty to cultivate (see: Nussbaum, 2009, ch. 12).

200

A Cynical and Pessimistic Theory of Friendship
The Cynics challenged Aristotle’s view.10 The reason Cynics can
deny the necessity of friendship is that the goal of philosophical training
is to make people self-sufﬁcient in living a simple and natural life. This,
in turn, renders the ﬂourishing person completely invulnerable to the
vicissitudes of life. Their training program focused on self-mastery.
Cynics disciplined their bodies through exercise, and they ignored all
academic subjects except ethics. They cultivated themselves through
simple living: eating only enough to survive, wearing only a single cloak,
and sleeping wherever they could. Diogenes of Sinope’s diet of onions
and residency inside a barrel were not gimmicks; they were exercises
of his philosophical commitment to a natural, simple life.11 This is why
the Cynics lashed out at wealth and reputation, and why they confronted
anyone who thought or taught otherwise. Their entire lives were efforts to
live the best life possible and to show others that they, too, could ﬂourish,
if only they abandoned the complications and anxieties of decadence (see:
Hard, 2012, s. 96-118).
Just like any external good (e.g. health, wealth, or reputation),
friendship could never be a necessary good for ﬂourishing for the Cynics.
Friends, like any good thing in life, are just part of the journey to become
self-sufﬁcient. And friends do not always contribute to that. Diogenes was
plain, “[H]appiness is this and nothing else, to be of truly good heart and
never distressed, wherever one is and whatever the moment may bring”
(Hard, 2012, s. 106b). There is no mention of wealth, reputation, or others
(contra Aristotle, 1984a, I). And friends are important only insofar as they
help in this pursuit. Diogenes emphasizes, “[T]o come off well in life, one
needs either good friends or ardent enemies; for friends instruct you, and
enemies expose your faults” (Hard, 2012, s. 297).12 On the journey toward
self-sufﬁciency and simplicity, enemies do just as well as friends because
they expose your shortcomings. The only important thing is that you learn
to improve yourself, that you become self-sufﬁcient and live simply.
The Cynics rebelled against Aristotle’s concept of ﬂourishing. They
agreed that ﬂourishing involves rigorous training of the self. But they
disagreed that ﬂourishing relies on friendship or community. Whatever
price they pay in a simple life, they receive a mode of ﬂourishing that
can be accomplished by anyone, anywhere, in any circumstances. On
the Cynic account, a friendless person could still ﬂourish. I could see
them advising a downtrodden, friendless Aristotelian by saying, “You are
dissatisﬁed with life and fortune precisely because you have the wrong
view of ﬂourishing.” Cynics would say that friends are indeed hard to ﬁnd
and make. But rather than bemoan this, they would offer it as evidence
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for why friendships should not be included as a necessary component of
ﬂourishing. You should not be afraid of lacking friends.13 After all, some
are satisﬁed with solitude and independence. Instead, the Cynics would
say that you should fear living a decadent life that makes you depend on
other people or that threatens your ability to comport yourself well toward
the simple joys of life. Friends might not contribute to this. In fact, they
might hinder it. So, they cannot be necessary.

Challenge 2: Good Friends Help You Move House;
Great Friends Help You Move a Body

Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett say that you would be a good friend to
someone by helping them move a body, like the plot of Death in Brunswick
(1990) where Dean helps his friend Carl hide the body of a person he
kills. For them, friendship only has a contingent connection to morality.14
Even friendships that compromise your moral standing might properly
be called “true and good” (2000, p. 279). Friendships are relationships
that have mutual affection, commitments to each other’s interests and
wellbeing, desires for shared experiences, a disposition to be directed by
the other person’s interests and activities, and mutual conceptions and
interpretations of the self. None of this need be connected to morality.
To them, friends helping each other hide a body might be morally
compromising but nonetheless indicative of a true and good friendship
(2000, sec. III). They therefore expunge questions of the moral value of
friendship from questions about the quality of its constitution.
What makes Cocking and Kennett’s thesis so controversial is that
the friendship literature leans Aristotelian. Aristotelians claim that true
friendships are those where people are interested in each other’s ethical
characters and ﬂourishing. And any friendship that jeopardizes either is,
by deﬁnition, not the best form of friendship and so cannot be assessed as
a true or good.15
I see the Cynics as an intermediary between these two camps. With
Aristotle, they agreed that friendship should be evaluated primarily in
ethical terms. But they also shared the caution and negative focus of
Cocking and Kennett in considering morally compromising situations.
Rather than focus on the beneﬁts of friendship, the Cynics often warn
against aligning yourself with people of questionable character. Diogenes
said, “How absurd it is that when we are intending to set off on a voyage,
we care to select the best travelling-companions, and yet, when we have
resolved to live well, we choose whomever chance sets in our path as
our companions in life” (Hard, 2012, s. 300). Rather than separating
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friendship from ethical evaluation, the Cynics warn that friendships can
have negative impacts. They notice that people often settle for befriending
those they meet by chance, rather than actively seeking out others with
similar moral commitments. This is curious to them because people
scrutinize less serious affairs, such as travelling, more than they scrutinize
their own choices of friends, who can inﬂuence every facet of life.16
The Cynics did not take friendship lightly. Not only does it affect your
own journey toward self-sufﬁciency, but it also comes with obligations.
They argued that friends must stick up for each other and, if they do
not, they are as bad as anyone maligning the friend (Hard, 2012, s. 304).
Schopenhauer adds to this insight, arguing that ‘friends’ often try to loan
money from you, and the more intimate a person is, the more likely he is to
transgress the bounds of propriety to take advantage of you, insult you, or
generally be rude (1902, §28).17 Schopenhauer also observes that people
often live their entire lives, including friendships, with ulterior motives or
personal interests that they keep secret. ‘Friends’ do not actually share the
innermost aspects of themselves, which are sometimes the driver behind
their lives. He even jokes that ‘friends’ talk badly about each other behind
each other’s backs and that, if you ever heard what your ‘friends’ said about
you, you would stop talking to them (§33). These comments highlight
that befriending anyone presents moral risk and burden. In associating
yourself with someone, you associate yourself with who they are, what
they do, and what they value. For Cynics, this is dangerous because it
can compromise your self-sufﬁciency. And for Pessimists, it is a risk that
might not be worth the labor because ‘friends’ keep signiﬁcant secrets
from each other and are not so friendly when they leave the room.
The Cynics and Pessimists agree with Aristotle that friends impact the
ethical quality of your life, but not always, or even usually, in a positive way.
Rather, they can distract you from self-sufﬁciency and create obligations.
Friendships take work. And given that life is difﬁcult, they might be
unworth the effort. Cynics and Pessimists take this ethical risk seriously.
And insofar as friendships jeopardize your character or self-sufﬁciency,
you are better off without them. Not only, then, are there practical worries
about how difﬁcult it is to make friends, as the ﬁrst challenge suggests.
But there are also ethical worries about the risks entailed. For Cynics
and Pessimists, it is often the case that having no friends is better than
having bad (or even mediocre) ones. Enemies, after all, will do the most
important tasks that a friend might. And there is no shortage of them.
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Cynics and Pessimists Make the Best Friends

I have argued two things: (1) friends are not necessary for ﬂourishing
for all people, and (2) friends present moral risks. But none of what I
have argued on behalf of the Cynics and Pessimists implies that they
are committed to being callous. Instead, the opposite is the case. Two
stories about the Cynic Crates of Thebes bear repeating, as they show that
Cynics and Pessimists often make fantastic friends. First, Crates heard
that Metrocles of Maroneia was going to kill himself. Metrocles was an
Aristotelian, holding that reputation matters for living a good life, and
he had ruined his by farting while giving a lecture. Ashamed, Metrocles
shut himself in to starve himself to death. Crates went to Metrocles and
tried to convince him that he did nothing wrong, as it was natural to fart.
Whenever his words failed to convince Metrocles, Crates farted in front
of him, thus showing that it was not shameful to fart while discussing
philosophy. Metrocles recovered from his melancholy and consequently
became a Cynic (Hard, 2012, s. 459). Second, Hipparchia of Maroneia,
Metrocles’ sister, fell in love with Crates. She ignored all other suitors,
and she threatened to kill herself if her family forbade her from marrying
him. The family spoke with Crates, requesting that he change her mind.
Crates agreed, went to Hipparchia, and argued that she should not marry
him. She remained unconvinced, however. So, he stripped naked and
said, “Here is your bridegroom, here are his possessions, make your
choice accordingly; for you will be no ﬁt companion for me if you do not
share the same way of life” (Hard, 2012, s. 455). He expected his display
of poverty and aged nakedness to stop her pursuit of him. Instead, she
matched his mode of dress and committed her life to Cynicism.
What can we draw from these stories? It would be incorrect to say
that the Cynics did not make friends. Crates married and had friends, and
they mutually supported each other in efforts to live the Cynic philosophy.
But what separated his friendships from others (and probably from many
of ours) is that he emphasized that the deepest, most intimate connections
we have with people ought to be natural, unashamedly displaying human
vulgarity and imperfection. Flattery, or even rhetorical dressing of human
vulnerabilities, never serves friendship. Rather, being comfortable about
natural functions and being open about human ﬂaws do. Schopenhauer
offered similar advice for living with other people. Whenever you meet
people, look at them and accept them for who they are—peculiar, immoral,
or dim as they may be. Do not scorn them or hope that they will change,
unjustly making their lives harder. Instead, consider who they actually are
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and interact with them accordingly (1902, §21). Schopenhauer did not
want to interact with many people, but he understood it took many types
to live in this world, and they deserve to be as they are too.
Cynics and Pessimists warn us about high-minded ideals of
ﬂourishing; they refocus us on self-sufﬁciency and cultivating our own
characters. And their remarks on friendship do the same. The Cynic and
the Pessimist both say that we should accept people’s ﬂaws and natural
ways of being, rather than ignoring them or hoping them to be something
else. Whenever you look at a person for who they actually are, then you
can understand the ways they might ﬁt into your life. This does not mean
that you must befriend them. But it means that you have a better idea of
what a friendship with them would be. Most people let their hopes, fears,
and desires distort the reality of relationships. We see what we want or
fear more often than reality.
I am not a Cynic or a Pessimist. But I think they have central points
about friendship right and have been ignored for too long. Friendship is
not always good, and, in fact, it can present grave risk and generate heavy
obligations. To separate the moral evaluation of friendship from the quality
of the friendship is a mistake, otherwise it is not worthy of the title “true and
good friendship.” And such a risky endeavor as friendship should not be
necessary for ﬂourishing for all people. Cynics and Pessimists understand
that we crave friendship, but they also understand that deep friendships
are not always possible in every circumstance in life. Rather than take this
as evidence that friendless people cannot ﬂourish, Cynics and Pessimists
encourage all to work on self-sufﬁciency and simplicity in living, which
more surely lead to ﬂourishing. They reveal that having no friends is
better than having bad ones. And they savor the friendships that they do
have when they have them. This ﬂaws-ﬁrst approach to relationships—
farts and wrinkles and all on display—creates a more human/e basis for
friendships. Sometimes, we need that Cynical or Pessimistic friend to
remind us that our expectations are too high, and that if we leave behind
pristine ideals for natural reality, we can be happy. In dire straits, we need
friends like Cynics and Pessimists. They nudge our vision away from our
failures to live up to heavenly ideals and retrain our vision on the ﬂawed
here, the imperfect self, and the ways that accepting our human simplicity
will serve us better than anything else.18
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Notes
1
When citing the Cynics, I will draw exclusively from Robin Hard’s
anthology and translations, and I will give the saying number rather than the page
number because it is more precise. Most times, his main reference text is G.
Giannantoni’s Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae.
2
Due to space constraints, I cannot fully address what friendship is, which
is separate from my primary concern of what friendship’s value is. The two
questions are related but distinct.
3
Oddly enough, not many philosophers address the risks of friendships in
detail. Aristotle tries to distinguish virtuous friendships from less virtuous types,
but the goal is to identify the best forms, not warn of the risks (1984a, VII-IX).
(Bernard Williams, 1981, pp. 15-6, makes this same observation when he says
that Aristotle requires that friendship minimize risks due to his implicit view of
self-sufﬁciency.) One exception among philosophers is Augustine of Hippo, who
recalls youthful stories of him stealing things for fun. But he admits that he would
not have done it if he were alone. Instead, his friends added pleasure to the theft
(1998, II.vii-x; see also: Nawar, 2015). This leads him to warn readers about
the company they keep. A last notable contemporary exception is Alexis Elder
(2014), who defends an Aristotelian idea that bad people cannot be good friends.
The contemporary aversion to addressing the ills of friendship contrasts with
common wisdom. Many I spoke with were able to give sayings about the risks
of friendship. Lawyer Dustin Faeder gave me the aphorism, “Lie down with the
dogs, and you’ll rise up with the ﬂeas,” which is attributed to Benjamin Franklin.
Minister Matthew Flores reminded me of the New Testament’s version, “Do not
be deceived: ‘Bad company corrupts good morals’” (1 Corinthians 15:33 NASB).
Artistic examples abound too, especially in youth genres. Philosopher Coleen
Watson turned my attention to Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone, where
Dumbledore says, “It takes a great deal of bravery to stand up to our enemies, but
just as much to stand up to our friends.” And mother Skye Wachtman mentioned
Pinocchio (1940), where Pinocchio befriends Lampwick, who corrupts him and
takes him to Pleasure Island, where boys get turned into donkeys for slavery.
Given the plethora of common advice to be cautious about friendships, the relative
lack of philosophical warnings is surprising.
4
Often, I will call “moral risk” this susceptibility to degradation of your
character and incurring obligations toward others. Friendships can affect the
ethical or moral qualities of your life. But it is important to distinguish that the
Cynics and Pessimists mean personal moral risk, about how your character is
changed or how your projects might become more complicated. They are not
concerned with interpersonal risks of, say, giving your friends the wrong advice
or failing them when they most need you, i.e. the risks that your friends take in
befriending you and how those affect your friendship.
5
Schopenhauer was a misanthrope, as seen in his advice for making friends:
“And in this view it is advisable to let every one of your acquaintance—whether
man or woman—feel now and then that you could very well dispense with their
company” (1902, §28), or again: “For my own part, I should certainly pay more
respect to an honest dog wagging his tail than to a hundred such [superﬁcial]
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demonstrations of human regard…. The egoism of human nature is so strongly
antagonistic to any such sympathy, that true friendship belongs to that class
of things—the sea-serpent, for instance—with regard to which no one knows
whether they are fabulous or really exist somewhere or other” (§33). But I think
there is a way to appreciate his insights on human sociality that does not entail
misanthropy, or so I hope for this paper.
6
I could not ﬁnd a single work devoted to any Cynic or Pessimist on
friendship. I would gladly receive recommendations.
7
Aristotle claims that people who live under the rule of tyrannical
governments cannot make friends with each other (1984a, VIII.11). This
introduces not only subjective and social luck, but broader political luck.
8
I am assuming here that the social element does not decrease the difﬁculty
of attaining virtue. Friendships increase the complexity of social relationships and
external goods; they make things more difﬁcult in certain ways. It does not seem
that, for Aristotle, having friends makes the paths toward virtue and ﬂourishing
easier. If we need to lift a heavy rock, more people would be preferable to fewer.
But if we need to perform surgery, more people might ruin things. It is unclear
which metaphor is more appropriate for how sociality affects the feasibility of
ﬂourishing.
9
Much of the ancient world reacted against Aristotle’s views on ﬂourishing.
They made ﬂourishing too fragile, especially for philosophers desiring more selfsufﬁciency. Most famously, the Stoics carved up the world into things you can
control and things you cannot (see: Epictetus, 1983, s. 1). And friends ﬁt into the
category of things you cannot, so they cannot be necessary for ﬂourishing. But
it is also worth noting that the Stoics wrote many beautiful odes to friendship
because it still held some non-ethical value to their lives. Friendship was a good,
but not one that contributed to ﬂourishing (see: Cicero, 1991; Seneca, 1991).
Even to philosophers who question dependence on social goods, such as the
Stoics, friendship holds an important place in life. An interesting complication
is that Stoics sometimes held ambivalent attitudes toward romantic love, which
might have parallels here for friendship (see: Cicero, 1927, Bk. IV).
10
I am putting aside interpretive concerns about whether the Cynics represent
a uniﬁed philosophy with positive views. I assume that they do. But I would
gladly entertain critics who would tease apart the different views of different
Cynics, for example by distinguishing Diogenes from Crates.
Though not a Cynic himself, Theodoros the Atheist expressed something the
Cynics could have afﬁrmed. He rejected friendship based on an observation:
foolish people have superﬁcial relationships that end as soon as the instrumental
advantages end, and wise people are so self-sufﬁcient that they do not need friends
(Hard, 2012, s. 633). The conclusion: friendship is not necessary for good living.
Friendship is nice to have, but lacking it will not break anyone.
11
The importance of simple living cannot be overemphasized. Aristotle’s
view of ﬂourishing requires that people live in complex communities. Whenever
that happens, people must depend on each other for various things. The more
complex a community, the less self-sufﬁcient it can be (ignoring science ﬁction
utopias where technology can do everything). For Aristotle, humans are animals
that live in complex communities, so they must be social.
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The Cynics would say that humans have lived in complex communities.
But they can live more simply and more self-sufﬁciently too. The more simply
you live, the less you must rely on others. This lack of dependence makes selfsufﬁciency and simplicity mutually supporting. Schopenhauer magniﬁes this
point by saying that independence is actually the best way to cultivate friendship.
That you do not need anyone makes you more open to better friendships (1902,
§28).
Cynical training involves inoculating people against dependence on other
people for goods like friendship. Cynic training was called a “shortcut to virtue,”
a quick path to the destination of ﬂourishing. But like all shortcuts, living the
Cynic life was grueling and transformed only those who survived.
12
Schopenhauer says something similar, “Your friends will tell you that they
are sincere; your enemies really are so. Let your enemies’ censure be like a bitter
medicine, to be used as a means of self-knowledge” (1902, §33).
13
I see this same motivation alive in contemporary literature. Cocking
and Kennett, for example, mention multiple times that a problem with assessing
friends with rigorous moral values makes friendship nearly impossible (2000, pp.
281, 289). I think Aristotle and the Cynics would both respond: so what? No
one said friendship would be easy. But whereas Aristotle would say friendship
is nonetheless necessary for ﬂourishing, the Cynics would say that its risk is why
they do not include it in ﬂourishing.
14
“It would be foolish to suggest of those cases where friendship moves us
against competing moral reasons that we thereby exhibit a lesser friendship or
realize less of the good of friendship” (Cocking and Kennett, 2000, p. 287).
15
I intentionally write “best form of friendship” because it is clear that the
Aristotelians reference friends of virtue or excellence. Aristotle is quite happy
to call other relationships friendships too, whether of pleasure or utility or some
other quality. Dean and Carl’s friendship would certainly be a useful friendship.
But that cannot be the debate here. For Cocking and Kennett’s argument to go
through, they need for Dean and Carl’s friendship to be the most superlative form
of friendship, analogous to virtuous friendship (without the moral component).
They need people, probably philosophers, to agree that what Dean did for Carl
is be a “true and good” friend to him (2000, pp. 279-81). If they do not take this
route, their paper becomes trivial because Aristotle would agree that Dean and
Carl are friends, just not of the highest sort. The distinction and superlativeness
matter.
16
Cynic Bion of Borysthenes echoes the same point, “We should keep a
close eye on our friends to see what kind of people they are, so that one should
not be thought to associate with rogues, or to turn away people of worth” (Hard,
2012, s. 512).
17
In Brave New World, Aldous Huxley has a similar insight, “One of the
principal functions of a friend is to suffer (in a milder and symbolic form) the
punishments that we should like, but are unable, to inﬂict upon our enemies”
(2006 [1932], p. 179).
18
I discussed many of the central ideas in this paper with Scott F. Aikin
and Robert Engelman, both of whom read a draft of this paper. I thank them for
accepting my ideas, ﬂaws and all, while also helping me with them.
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